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DISINFORMATION

Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast

CALENDAR

FALL '85 CAMPAIGN AGAINST SDI

Although there are signs that Moscow might mute its demand for an outright ban on the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Soviet leaders are nonetheless mounting a major active measures and disinformation campaign against SDI this fall. **Their overall objective—to derail SDI. Their strategy—to create a coalition in Western Europe and the US that isolates SDI proponents in the Reagan administration and the very few prominent supporters of SDI in Europe from most Western**

governments, opposition parties, and business and labor on both sides of the Atlantic. This is clear from daily Soviet statements and propaganda, Gorbachev's meetings with Western politicians and journalists over the summer and early fall, tasking to international fronts and Communist parties, and items about SDI which are now appearing regularly in publications in the West under Soviet influence.

This campaign is not only aimed at exploiting directly the cleavages in the US, but also at injecting European pressure into the US political debate. They are seeking to isolate the only two major European leaders who support SDI—Kohl and Thatcher. Both leaders have serious political problems of their own, and also find that they are somewhat isolated on SDI within their
—SDI continued on page 2

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 1985-1986

Likely targets for Soviet active measures and disinformation campaigns.

—October 1985—

40th Anniversary of founding of UN, Disarmament Week, and General Assembly Session—will be used to promote the major Soviet themes that Moscow is seeking a peaceful world, has proposed many initiatives, but that Western policies—especially Reagan's—are the root cause of conflict and tension.

—November 1985—

Dutch decision on INF deployment—Likely to be close. Moscow will seek to persuade the Dutch to delay or decide against. Even if the present government approves deployment, the parliamentary election scheduled for the spring may lead to reversal.

Unilateral Soviet moratorium on deployment of SS-20's expires—a bargaining and propaganda opportunity just before the Summit, just after the Belgian elections, and coinciding with the Dutch decision on INF deployment.

—CALENDAR continued on page 10

WHY AND HOW THIS FORECAST

Almost all publications dealing with Soviet behavior confine themselves to study and analysis of past and current developments. Few, if any, seek explicitly to project such behavior into the future. Moreover, contemporary studies focus on internal political developments, and when concerned with Soviet foreign policy, they seek to assess important traditional instruments of Soviet statecraft such as military power, negotiations, diplomacy and economic assistance programs. However significant these elements, there is another dimension of Soviet policy that until now has rarely been addressed in such publications, namely, the use of the unique Soviet instrument of ACTIVE MEASURES and DISINFORMATION to affect Western perceptions and decisionmaking. *Forecast* will attempt to anticipate major Soviet

active measures and disinformation campaigns directed against the United States and its allies.

An extended definition of the term "active measures" that Soviet professionals use to describe these techniques appears on page 8. Moscow's efforts to affect Western perceptions and specific decisions have a long history, reaching back at least to the earliest days of the Russian Revolution. They remain a major instrument of Soviet policy today.

Forecast will single out the Soviet Union for attention. The values of the Soviet elite, their decisionmaking, central coordination, control of media, fronts, resources, and disinformation techniques—Moscow's objectives and capabilities—are fundamentally different from US values and practices. While other states regularly engage in propaganda and public relations, and sometimes covert action, no other contemporary state appears to utilize global active measures as a major instrument, or devotes the resources and the full panoply of active measures and disinformation techniques


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Fall Colors
International Year of
Peace 1986**

**Moscow is already prepared
Vocabulary—What is Active Measures
Ethnos—The Major Greek Daily
Moscow Machine
and the Summit**





—SDI—continued from page 1

own Cabinets and parties.

In Western Europe, where there is already considerable neutralist sentiment, Moscow is pressuring West Germany and is also trying to ensure that France, Italy, Japan and Canada do not support the US initiative. Over the summer, Moscow intensified its pressure and activities. For example, Leonid Zamyatin, Head of the International Information Department of the CPSU, told the West Germans that by supporting the SDI, Chancellor Kohl was upsetting the detente relationship that had been established between the FRG and Moscow. Other commentators reiterated this message, as did Gorbachev in his warm reception in Moscow for the West German opposition leader, Johannes Rau, in early September, and in a telegram to Willy Brandt, Chairman of the SDP and the main leader of the Socialist International. Soviet-influenced demonstrations and protests in Germany also emphasized that the opposition SPD, which is gaining in support and which opposes SDI, was less likely to upset Moscow than Kohl. European leaders such as Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and French President Mitterand are also being encouraged to play the role of intermediaries between East and West.

By hinting at a trade-off of offensive forces for US curtailment of SDI, Gorbachev is trying to influence the shape of the debate in the US, to split the Reagan administration, and weaken Congressional support even for continuous research funding for the program, let alone authority for weapons development.

In the US, however, Moscow cannot help but be aware of the difficulties of generating the kind of opposition to SDI that was prevalent in the nuclear freeze campaign in 1982. (At that time, for example, as the *New Republic* and other sources indicated, Moscow, through fronts such as the US Peace Council, was able to influence the direction of the nuclear freeze movement.) During the fall, Soviet active measures specialists and their allies in the US will be searching for a popular theme, slogan, or tactic that can be employed in 1986 to increase anti-SDI pressure on the Congress and the administration—at a time in the US Congressional electoral cycle which will ensure widespread attention and debate.

One tactic currently being debated in US organizations controlled or substantially influenced by Moscow is a "People's Peace Treaty." This would take the form of a petition addressed to

An example of the increasingly sophisticated overt Soviet propaganda campaign against SDI.

the President of the US and the President of the USSR promoting Soviet priorities in disarmament and arms control. Millions of signatures would be collected in the Soviet Union and the US—patterned after the successful model of the "Stockholm Peace Appeal" organized nearly thirty years ago by the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council.

We can expect activity on several different levels:

- The CPSU International Department will arrange a very active "cultural exchange" program between "Soviet scientists" (primarily from the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and other "academic" institutions) and their "colleagues" in Europe, the US and Canada. These gatherings are likely to attract substantial media coverage.

- Soviet "parliamentarians" and the CPSU International Department's representatives will meet with leaders of the Socialist International, Socialist parties, Christian Democratic parties and key non-governmental organizations to stress Soviet positions and encourage Western politicians to pressure the US before it is "too late."

- "Appeals" and "statements" on the elimination of SDI will be provoked by the Soviets both in the US and Europe.

- Critical statements about SDI by American politicians and public organizations will be used by the Soviets in Europe and elsewhere to create the impression of "mass protests" in the US against the "militaristic Reagan administration."

The following **specific major Soviet themes**, briefly summarized here, will be used in these meetings and in covert propaganda:

- The US is developing a first strike capability: This move, of which SDI is an integral part, is destabilizing and

—continued top of page 3

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will eliminate any hope of improving US-USSR relations and a return to détente in Europe and elsewhere. It is dramatically increasing tension between the superpowers.

● SDI does not make strategic sense. The Soviet Union will be able to develop effective countermeasures. Indeed SDI will provoke an "appropriate" Soviet response, forcing the Soviet Union to develop "revolutionary new" weapons systems.

● The world is being driven to the brink of nuclear war. Moscow will have to take the necessary steps to protect itself in the European theater, particularly by strengthening its nuclear forces aimed at Western Europe. There will be no arms control agreements, only exacerbation of existing tensions, intensification of the arms race, crises, and, potentially, nuclear holocaust.

● Moscow is willing to reach an agreement with the US banning the development of anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons, and the use of space for military purposes, and to reduce offensive forces. However, the

US must agree, in advance, not to develop the capability to use space for military purposes.

These themes will be picked up by the press and recycled, although Soviet fronts and European Communist parties are not enjoying the popular and propaganda successes they achieved in the early 1980's. Nevertheless, the Soviet campaign will be designed to pressure US diplomats and negotiators abroad and decision makers in Washington.

This combination of the carrot and stick—the promise of improved relations combined with threats and scare tactics—will be the hallmark of the Soviet campaign at least through the Summit.

All 13 major international fronts, particularly the World Peace Council, will be centers for the anti-SDI campaign.

The fronts and their satellites will intensify personal appeals to foreign statesmen, parliamentarians, scientists, and professional associations of doctors, lawyers and journalists. One group likely to be particularly active is: the Working Group of the Commit-

tee of Soviet Scientists for Peace Against the Nuclear Threat, led by Academician R. Z. Sagdeev, Director of the Institute for Space Research, and Dr. A. A. Kakoshkin, Deputy Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. The latter institute has a long history of collecting information on US leaders and developments and also of being used by the Soviets to influence US decision-making. According to a former KGB active measures practitioner with recent experience, the new Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace is under the control of the CPSU International Department and Service A (active measures) of the KGB's First Chief Directorate.

As Director of Central Intelligence William Casey put it recently, "The Soviet anti-SDI disinformation campaign has dramatically increased its tempo since the announcement of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting set for this fall." It will not abate anytime soon.

GORBACHEV'S FALL COLORS

Following a historic pattern with new leaders, the Soviet external overt and covert propaganda machinery is engaged in a **campaign to exploit a particular image of the new Soviet leader** to enhance Soviet power in 1985 and beyond. Gorbachev, his veteran advisors and his new staff, have clearly decided, for now at least, to diminish the very harsh anti-Reagan rhetoric of recent years. At the same time, they are signaling the West that it could reappear. Until the 1984 election, the Reagan Presidency was portrayed as "Nazi-like" and Reagan himself as the most dangerous world leader since Hitler. Now Moscow maintains that there are "fascistic" tendencies in the US, that Reagan appears "mindless," and that the world is becoming very dangerous, but there is still hope that tensions can be reduced. Moreover Gorbachev has decided that an image that portrays him as open to the West will be useful in his efforts to affect US and European decisions.

Through meetings with foreign governmental and opposition leaders, public speeches, and "special interviews" with foreign media, Moscow is fostering this image. Mikhail (now called Michael) Gorbachev is being portrayed as a "realist," and a "reformer." It is also promoted by anonymous sources in Moscow and Eastern Europe "well-connected" with the Kremlin, the International Department and the KGB, as well as through lunches and cocktail party chatter with Soviet "diplomats" in Eastern European and Western capitals.

Among the themes that the active measures apparatus is promoting are:

Personality: Gorbachev is young, energetic, popular, modern, decisive, and **above all a realist.** He may be a Marxist-Leninist, but he is of a "new" school. He understands the complexities of modern life, even though he sometimes uses well-worn propaganda slogans. He and his wife are charming, reasonable and open-minded, like most elected politicians in the West. They are **predictable and trustworthy.**

Views on Domestic Affairs: A protégé of Yuri Andropov (rather than Chernenko), he gives the impression

that he is "tough" only from the point of establishing better discipline in the workplace and in financial and personal affairs. His reforms will result in improved economic and social conditions throughout the Soviet Union as well as in the standard of living of the average Soviet citizen.

Gorbachev himself also gives the impression that he is very busy with domestic reform (for example, his speech last spring nominating Gromyko as Chairman of the Presidium, and his interview with *Time* in September), but has not made specific proposals. There are hints and rumors that the reforms will be "liberal" and free market-oriented, such as decentralization modeled on Gorbachev's success in the Crimea in the 1970s. Whatever they are, however, the impression is given that Gorbachev will be opposed by the old style, corrupt, well-entrenched, Brezhnev-era bureaucracy. Hence, **he will need the help of innovative methods, trade and new technology to convert the Soviet economy from military to consumer production and to sweeten the pill of reform.**

—GORBACHEV continued on page 4

—GORBACHEV—continued from page 3
Gorbachev's Image on Foreign Policy and Defense: As he surveys the international scene, Gorbachev presumably is aware of obvious opportunities and vulnerabilities. Clearly Moscow is having difficulties preventing the deployment of NATO's INF and the SDI program, which could negate much of the Soviet military buildup of the 1970s. He also knows that to consolidate his position and increase his influence at home, he should avoid a major foreign policy failure, or there must be a good explanation if he can't make any headway internationally. As a relatively young man, he can be the major world leader for twenty or more years, and with the advantage of a fresh, relatively untarnished image he can pick specific objectives, targets and themes. As might be expected, he is projecting himself and a sophisticated strategy to turn the Summit meeting to Soviet — and personal — advantage.

In this context, he prefers to create the impression that he is not planning any major expansion of Soviet power in Europe and the Third World, and indeed that he is seeking arms control and a lessening of dangerous tensions with the US. While he demonstrates that he will play a personal role in diplomacy and arms control negotiations, he professes that his main concerns are a return to "détente" and emphasis on domestic reform. At the end of his *Time* interview, for example, Gorbachev asked rhetorically what external conditions the Soviet Union would need to be able to achieve "truly grandiose plays in the domestic sphere." The answer was clearly détente.

Moscow also seems intent on fostering at least two sub-themes designed to affect Western behavior and enhance Gorbachev's image. One is that Gorbachev is a realist and is aware of the complexities of world politics. The Soviet Union has recently proposed various arms control initiatives (a test ban moratorium, a ban on chemical weapons, and a ban on the military use of space). If Reagan and the West do not want to improve relations and negotiate seriously, it is not his fault. Moscow will try, but if the US is unreasonable, Soviet leaders suggest that they will wait out the Reagan administration, hoping that there can be arms control with a more reasonable US government in the late 1980s. This, Moscow says, would be very dangerous for world peace and

even "explosive," but Gorbachev after all is "realistic."

Second, Moscow seeks to create the impression that the new Soviet leader is open to new patterns of international relations and new initiatives. He and his spokesmen constantly reiterate that there are many "complex" factors in international relations, and many players on the world scene. Gorbachev wishes to appear open to initiatives not tied to old formulations and to US-USSR negotiations. In his speeches, his almost weekly meetings with foreign leaders, and through diplomatic initiatives, he indicates that he is willing to deal with democratic opposition parties and governments in Europe and Israel, and even with the Chinese, in ways that haven't been tried before. The last few months' diplomatic maneuvers and rumors, such as those about

Moscow seeks to create the impression that the new Soviet leader is open to new patterns of international relations and new initiatives.

establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, have not been used to achieve any specific results, but rather to signal that Moscow can be dealt with — with or without the US. This is designed to pressure the US and stimulate fissures and tensions between the US and its allies, as foreign governments and opposition leaders are led to believe that they can become a bridge between the US and the USSR or that they can solve problems bilaterally with the Soviet Union.

The campaign to bring Gorbachev "closer" to the West, to show him as a liberal leader and reformer, is likely to continue throughout this fall, unless Moscow decides that it is impossible to shift US defense priorities in the next year or two.

These conclusions are based on analysis of Soviet propaganda and active measures activities and the recent statements of Gorbachev and other members of the Politburo. We **project the following** in the Kremlin's external image building throughout this fall:

● An attempt to portray the Soviet leader as reasonable, willing to negoti-

ate directly with the Europeans and others independently of the US. This is primarily designed to exacerbate tension between the US and its allies in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere.

● Massive attempts to alter the defense priorities of the Reagan administration, particularly SDI — by means of overt diversified demagoguery, and pressure on US allies, as well as through secret active measures.

● Attempts to create the impression among European and American governmental leaders, as well as opposition leaders and businessmen, that the most effective way to achieve a constructive improvement in US-Soviet and European-Soviet relations is the reactivation of travel, trade, cultural and technological exchanges.

● If there appears to be some basis to change US defense priorities, or if the Summit produces a breakthrough, or even increased travel, cultural and trade relations with the US, Gorbachev will claim to be a great statesman as well as a domestic reformer. Active measures to further the shift in US policies will intensify.

● If on the other hand there are no substantial changes in the Geneva Arms negotiations, and no real possibilities of changing US defense priorities, nor even a resumption of Aeroflot landing rights and cultural exchange agreements with the US, Gorbachev will certainly blame the failure of the Summit and the lack of change in US-USSR relations on Reagan and his advisors.

Whatever the outcome — Gorbachev and his image makers are trying to create a scenario from which he personally will benefit. A shift in US priorities will increase his prestige both in domestic and foreign affairs; an apparent failure will be used to cast the US as villain, and the Soviet leader will claim to both internal and external audiences that his priority was domestic reform in any case.

INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF PEACE—1986


Like recent International Years the UN-designated International Year of Peace (IYP) will be used by Moscow for propaganda purposes and to influence Western behavior.

Moscow will pursue a two-pronged approach: first, in the United Nations, where the Soviet Bloc and the Third World/anti-Israel coalition wield disproportionate influence especially in the intricate committee system of that organization; and second, in their international fronts and in the genuine non-governmental organizations where they have influence.

In the UN system (according to a 1985 Senate Intelligence Committee report) Soviet officials are playing a direct and major role in guiding the IYP process—notably Viacheslav Ustinov (Under Secretary General for Political and Security Council Affairs); Anatoly Mkrtchyan (Director, External Relations Division of the Department of Public Information); Sema Tanguiane (Assistant Director General, UNESCO); and Andrei Soloviev, (in charge of relations with non-governmental organizations for the UN Information Service, Geneva). Krzysztof Ostrowski, Executive Secretary of the Operational Secretariat for the IYP, is Polish.

So far, experts designated by 95 member states, together with representatives of 20 organizations within the UN system and 76 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have participated in preparatory regional meetings and seminars. The General Assembly will proclaim the IYP on October 24, 1985—the UN's 40th Anniversary. A good deal of UN-sponsored activity can be expected, and the Soviets are currently positioning themselves to make maximum use of this medium.

As in the case of the current International Youth Year, Moscow will be concentrating a major portion of its resources on the front organizations and on agent-of-influence operations—all ostensibly at the non-governmental level—to discredit the US and other Western states. At present, Moscow is the only power playing a significant



global role in mobilizing and coordinating this important sector.

INTERNATIONAL YEARS AND DECADES DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS** (1979-1995)

<u>Years</u>	
1979	International Year of the Child
1981	International Year of the Disabled
1983	International World Communications Year
1985	International Youth Year (Participation, Development and Peace)
1986	International Year of Peace
1987	International Year of Shelter for the Homeless
<u>Decades</u>	
1975-1985	Decade for Women
1980-1990	Second Disarmament Decade
1983-1993	Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination
1985-1995	Twenty-fifth Anniversary Decade of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

**Partial Listing

In recent years, Moscow not only has built up its own major international fronts, such as the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, and the World Federation of Democratic Students, but also has created scores of satellite fronts such as the International Progress Organization, the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, Generals for Peace and Disarmament, and the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament known as the Dublin Committee.

In addition, the Soviets have launched a major effort through their front organizations to gain control of the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO) which has consultative status in the UN's Economic and Social Council. (CONGO is the major representative and coordinating body of international NGOs. It was pro-Western in the 1960s.) According to European journalists who follow UN activities, Moscow is likely to gain near total control of this body when Soviet fronts and organizations that are substantially influenced by Moscow are elected to CONGO's Board this fall.

Some indications of how Moscow will exploit its control may come at a major CONGO conference focusing on the IYP planned for January 1986, which will include major non-communist international NGO's.

Later in the year, the major international NGOs' meeting to celebrate IYP will be the "World Peace Congress" in Denmark. This function will be organized by Soviet international fronts, coordinated by the World Peace Council. As the major international NGO activity, however, it will attract much broader support. Like the recently concluded World Youth Festival in Moscow (according to press reports attended by more than 20,000) the Soviet leaders may not be able to control all aspects of the meeting. At the moment, however, the agenda consists of top Soviet priorities including:

"prevention of an arms race in outer space and effective measures to stop it on earth; halt to the deployment of missiles; nuclear test ban; nuclear weapon-free zones; freeze of strategic weaponry..."

THE MOSCOW MACHINE AND THE SUMMIT

Soviet leaders would like to achieve a major change in US defense priorities by November, but Moscow is positioning itself to exploit the Summit not only to achieve specific objectives this fall, but also to influence US and European decisions in 1986 and beyond — whatever happens in Geneva.

In their discussion about the Summit, they allow for three possibilities. Their preferred outcome would be the type of major and specific agreements which they claim were achieved in the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings in 1972. Even at times of great tension they maintain that it is possible to reach important agreements on weapons. The situation is tense now, "explosive" as Gorbachev put it, but this they argue is the time to save humanity from another deadly round of the arms race and the likelihood of war. Moscow will focus attention on the great opportunity and the necessity for achieving a major agreement in November or soon thereafter.

Soviet leaders will seek to keep the agenda of the meeting away from human rights, Afghanistan and other regional problems which tend to put Moscow on the defensive. Moscow will focus on these issues only if the United States forces them onto the table. Then of course, just as Moscow has begun to do in retaliation to the British for the expulsion of Soviet intelligence personnel, the US will be blamed for all major global problems, particularly denying basic human rights even to its own people.

A second type of Summit, which they consider as less useful, would be modeled on the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in 1961, where the leaders got to know one another but where no formal document was signed. This, a leading Soviet commentator said in September, probably will be the pattern in Geneva. Gorbachev would use the meeting not only to make his own assessment of Reagan, but also to improve chances for travel and cultural agreements with the US, interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland in 1981, and which Moscow badly wants to see resumed.

Gorbachev then will be in a position to propose another meeting and to use negotiation with an admixture of active measures to derail SDI and other US priorities in 1986 and 1987.

A third possibility, remote at this point, is that Moscow will cancel the Summit, and blame the US for endangering world peace. So far Moscow has not threatened this. But Soviet leaders have been turning up the negative volume lately and claiming that the US is not serious about the meeting. This is designed to put maximum pressure on the US in November. Gorbachev, for example, in his interview with *Time* professed "disappointment" and "concern," stating that the US was not preparing seriously for the meeting and that success depended on serious preparations. "... actions today largely determine the scenario for our

Moscow seeks to create the impression that the new Soviet leader is open to new patterns of international relations and new initiatives

November discussion...." But if Moscow believes that not even increased trade and travel with the US will result from the Summit, or there is a major international incident, Moscow will claim, as it has been doing, that Reagan is inciting the American people to "hate" the Soviet people, that the US is using the meeting as a smoke-screen for space weapons tests and hence no discussion is useful in such an atmosphere.

If the Summit produces some results, even if only increased travel, cultural, and trade agreements with the US, Gorbachev will be presented both as a great statesman — and a domestic reformer. He will be called a "new type of Soviet leader" who has been able to improve relations with the US, even at a time of great tension. And domestically his diplomatic initiative will have paid off just as he is replacing many CPSU leaders and preparing for the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress and a new Party platform in February.

If Moscow decides to maintain the **Summit is a failure**, because there are no agreements at all and no shift in US

defense priorities, the blame will be placed on militaristic, unreasonable advisers in the Reagan entourage (principally Weinberger, McFarlane, and Perle), who are not taking advantage of a historic moment and ignoring the reasonable and realistic positions of the Soviet Union. Indeed, in light of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, Soviet proposals to ban chemical weapons, and other Soviet "initiatives," Reagan will be called negative and dangerous. To bolster their propaganda, Moscow almost certainly will cite European and particularly American politicians and journalists who are critical of Reagan. Both overtly and covertly they will feature quotes and recycle statements from the American press and Congressional critics who may believe Reagan did not take adequate advantage of the opportunity to improve US-Soviet relations.

A new Soviet tactic — the courting of US and European media — has been recognized and widely reported in the West. In anticipation of the Summit, according to a former Soviet active measures specialist, agents-of-influence in the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Austria, both in political circles and the media, are now being tasked to spread the word that Soviet positions on the key Summit issues are reasonable and provide a basis for "compromise" with Washington. Soviet meetings with Western European political leaders and the media before November will provide Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders with further opportunities to "float" negotiating positions, and pressure the Europeans and Japanese.

In addition to pre-Summit press briefings, the 3,000 media personnel expected in Geneva for the Summit can expect to find Soviet spokesmen more accessible than in the past. Moscow will make available to Western media Soviet "journalists," "scholars," and commentators both in Geneva and in Western capitals, seeking to obtain air time on Western television and radio in news programs and talk shows, as well as providing special "backgrounders" for the print media. These Soviet commentators are not, of course, independent individuals, but will be selected to appear in Western media by the active measures apparatus, and they will receive guidance if not outright instruction on the themes they are to promote in their media opportunities. ■



Yannis Yannikos, the veteran Communist publisher; entrepreneur and current *Ethnos* publisher George Bobolas (center); and Vasily Sitnikov (right) sign publishing agreements in Moscow in June 1978. Behind them stands Alexander Filippopoulos, now the editor of *Ethnos*.

THE ETHNOS CASE IN GREECE

In Papandreou's Greece there is considerable evidence that the largest daily newspaper *Ta Ethnos*, which is pro-government, and which frequently replays Soviet disinformation and forgeries, was created and financed by the Soviet Union. Paul Anastasi, for years a reporter for the London *Daily Telegraph* and a stringer for the *New York Times*, provides substantial documentation for the Soviet connection in his 317-page book, *Take the Nation in Your Hands*, published in Greece in 1983.

Ethnos reappeared in September 1981 after a centrist paper bearing the same title was closed down by the Colonel's regime which ruled Greece from 1967-1974. *Ta Ethnos* (The Nation), emerged with a slick professional tabloid format, and quickly grew to a peak daily circulation of about 180,000. Alexander Filippopoulos, editor of *Ethnos*, said the paper was designed to be "profoundly anti-imperialist, profoundly democratic,

free, truly objective... we have chosen our journalists to be progressive people, commenting properly on events."

In his book, Anastasi traces the backgrounds of those who launched the publication. Yannis Yannikos and George Bobolas, were to be joint owners. Yannikos and Bobolas, prior to creating *Ethnos*, had substantial and long-standing Soviet political and business connections, according to Anastasi.

Ethnos employed Constantin Tsakotelis as foreign editor and Carl Marzani as American correspondent. Tsakotelis had previously worked in Czechoslovakia for *Telepress*, a newspaper used for Soviet Bloc propaganda in the 1950's. Marzani was jailed in the US in 1947 for perjury—lying about his communist party membership while working for US intelligence (OSS) and the State Department. The paper's British correspondent, Stanley Harrison, was until 1981 sub-editor of the British Communist Party's *Morning Star*, and the Cypriot correspondent, Akis Fantis, is a member of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Cyprus and editor of one of its publications.

Yannikos is a communist whose death sentence for wartime activities had been commuted. After he was released from jail in 1955, he apparently contacted the Russians and

became a principal editor and publisher of Soviet publications in Greece. When democracy was restored in Greece in 1975, Yannikos developed a close relationship with the Soviet copyright office VAAP. Anastasi charges that VAAP was being run by two men who had been senior KGB officers, Boris Pankin and Vasily Sitnikov. (Sitnikov has been identified by at least two KGB defectors as having been a senior official in the KGB's active measures and disinformation section.)

Anastasi broke the story of the Soviet connection when the *Ethnos* deal turned sour for Yannikos. The Anastasi book tells how Yannikos was encouraged by Sitnikov to join forces with George Bobolas, who also had extensive financial dealings with Moscow, to reestablish *Ethnos*. They, in turn, hired Filippopoulos as Editor for the Greek daily. Yannikos, apparently pushed out by Bobolas and Sitnikov, told the story to Anastasi.

Bobolas and Filippopoulos subsequently sued Anastasi, and he was convicted of libel in Greek court. But Anastasi countersued for defamation and wiretapping, and a two year court battle is coming to an end. In addition, *Ethnos* has brought suits against *L'Express* and *The Economist* which also wrote about the link with Moscow.

Ethnos stories that echo Soviet active measures themes include:

- KAL Flight 007, shot down by the Soviets, was a deliberate provocation by the CIA, and Moscow was justified in shooting it down.

- Poland's Solidarity works for the CIA and the "Mafia-backed Vatican."

- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is justifiable to protect it from "conquest and panic." The Afghan resistance fighters are "bandits and paid murderers who enter from Pakistan and commit horrendous crimes..."

- The murder of Indira Ghandi was reported as if the CIA were responsible, and an editor described the assassination as "an imperialist move."

An article appearing in the *Wall Street Journal*, in June 1984 concluded, "Whatever the role of the KGB, there is no controversy about the following: that Mr. Bobolas got an agreement from the Soviet copyright office to publish the Soviet Encyclopedia in a profit seeking venture, that he is also the creator of *Ethnos*, and that the paper unashamedly adheres to a pro-Soviet anti-American line."

VOCABULARY: ACTIVE MEASURES

"Active Measures" (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) is a Soviet term which came into use in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to describe overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents. This frequently involves attempts to deceive the target (foreign governmental and non-governmental elites or mass audiences), and to distort the target's perceptions of reality to affect decisions that serve Soviet interests. Although active measures are principally political in nature, military maneuvers and paramilitary assistance to insurgents and terrorists may also be involved.

There is no equivalent term in the West describing the intent, scope, intensity, centralization, and sophistication of active measures. Active measures go far beyond the well-known practices of propaganda or psychological warfare which seek to propagate particular viewpoints and are aimed at affecting attitudes and only indirectly behavior. They are also different from traditional diplomacy and negotiation conducted between states which primarily are concerned with representation and bargaining between governments.

Active measures campaigns are conceived, planned and systematically executed by the centralized leadership and bureaucracy as an integral part of Soviet efforts to support their foreign policy globally. As such, they should not be considered as simply tactics or tools used only in an ad hoc fashion when opportunities arise. They are a fundamental instrument, and are fully coordinated with general policy at the Politburo level. Moscow's "main enemy" — the United States and its allies — receive the bulk of attention.

Active measures are conducted covertly by the KGB and Soviet Bloc sister intelligence and security ser-

vices. These are coordinated with "grey" semi-covert operations by the CPSU International Department, conducted through the international Soviet fronts, semi-clandestine radios and non-ruling Communist parties and factions under Soviet control. They may also be conducted overtly through officially-sponsored foreign propaganda channels, diplomatic relations, and cultural diplomacy. Important campaigns are often conducted through *Kombinatsia*: coordination of overt, grey and covert channels simultaneously.

The apparatus for developing and conducting disinformation and active measures campaigns is under the direct control of the CPSU's Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo, which annually approve active measures plans. Plans are developed and

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implemented primarily by several major organs — the International Department, and Service A of the First Chief Directorate, as well as sections of the Second Chief Directorate of the Committee for State Security (KGB), assisted by the CPSU International Information Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other Soviet organizations, such as the "academic" institutes of the Soviet Academy of Science, like Georgiy Arbatov's Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, are also used to support such efforts. As many as 10,000-15,000 individuals in Moscow and additional thousands abroad are part of the Soviet active measures apparatus.

The US government estimates that Moscow spends approximately \$3-4 billion each year to support these campaigns. No other government or party in the world has at its disposal such a centralized global apparatus that controls its own media at home and abroad, 90 or more political parties throughout the world, 13 major international fronts, scores of lesser fronts, and many hun-

dreds of full-time legal and illegal intelligence officers in Moscow and abroad who directly control hundreds of agents-of-influence and indirectly seek to influence on a regular basis the perceptions and behavior of thousands of journalists, businessmen, union officials, scholars and politicians in the West.

Soviet active measures techniques include:

Written or Oral Disinformation — false, purposely incomplete or misleading information used to deceive an audience. Both overt and clandestine outlets are used to spread disinformation, including clandestine radios.

Front Organizations — apparently independent but actually closely controlled non-governmental organizations used to promote specific objectives.

Political Influence Operations — individual contacts or "agents-of-influence" used to promote Soviet objectives. These individuals may be directly controlled and recruited agents, or are "trusted contacts" who consciously collaborate but are not recruited agents, or unwitting but manipulated individuals. They are selected for their ability to influence significant governmental and non-governmental elites.

Forgeries — authentic-looking but false documents and communiques used in clandestine influence operations. The principal targets tend to be political elites, though mass audiences may be selected as well. Forgeries are frequently designed for placement in the media.

Active Measures are considered an element of "ideological work" to be waged relentlessly to ensure that, in Lenin's phrase, "word becomes deed."

COMING IN NEXT ISSUE

- Major KGB Disinformation and Active Measures Campaigns in 1986 — forecast of Soviet priorities.

- The Wilderness of Mirrors — how Moscow is trying to neutralize Western efforts to expose Soviet active measures.

- The next round in the Soviet campaign against SDI.

—*FORECAST*—continued from page 1 that are routinely used by Moscow. These Soviet values and practices deserve to be better understood.

There is still debate among journalists, government officials and scholars about the scope and effectiveness of Soviet active measures. During the past few years, however, a great deal of evidence has become available which has enabled both Western governments and independent scholars and journalists to evaluate and to understand better the magnitude of this effort and the Soviet institutions which plan and implement these programs. A description of the extensive Soviet apparatus for conducting active measures appears on page 8.

METHODS

The methods to be employed in forecasting Soviet active measures are an outgrowth of the techniques and sources used by researchers who have been studying past Soviet behavior. This research has indicated that for decades Moscow has utilized the instrument it now calls active measures closely coordinated with more traditional instruments of statecraft. To firmly establish these findings, additional research and testing of hypotheses about Soviet attempts to manipulate Western decisions from the 1920s to the 1980s is underway. Supplementing the traditional approach to studying overt Soviet behavior, new sources and techniques also are being utilized: the reports and files of Western intelligence agencies which have become increasingly available to the public; the trials and activities of convicted Soviet agents-of-influence, and, perhaps most importantly, information and analysis from former Soviet Bloc practitioners now living in the West.

In addition to testing hypotheses in past Soviet action, it may be possible to test them, partially at least, by forecasting aspects of future behavior. Based on studies of past Soviet activities it may be possible to identify at an early stage Soviet active measure campaigns and to anticipate some aspects of their evolution.

This publication is devoted to this endeavor. To accomplish this, we will regularly monitor: (1) The public statements of Soviet leaders and daily press of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and particularly the overt publications of the organs

responsible for active measures; (2) Related activities and statements of Communist Parties in the Soviet Bloc and Western Europe, the U.S. Asia and Latin America; (3) Related activities, statements, seminars, and press of the 13 major and several lesser Soviet front groups regularly receiving instructions from the Soviet Union; (4) Exposed agent-of-influence operations designed to support Soviet policy objectives; (5) Documented instances of disinformation designed to deceive and manipulate, such as forgeries or covertly placed media articles that are later uncovered.

Academic specialists on Soviet foreign policy, former senior active measures practitioners, and experts on Communist Party political campaign activity in Europe, Asia and Central America will serve on our Advisory Board and as consultants, providing their informed analysis of what we can expect from the Soviet leadership. Among those who have already agreed to serve on the Advisory Board are Professors **Uri Ra'an** and **Richard Shultz** of the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who specialize in Soviet decisionmaking and use of active measures and disinformation. Three former Soviet Bloc active measures practitioners also will serve on the Advisory Board: **Ladislav Bittman**, who served as a Czech intelligence officer and deputy director of the Czech intelligence service Disinformation Department; **Ilya Dzhirkvelov**, who served in the KGB's First and Second Chief Directorates, and was Deputy General Secretary of the Soviet Organization of Journalists; and **Stanislav Levchenko**, who worked with the CPSU's International Department and as an active measures specialist in the KGB's First Chief Directorate. The editor of *Forecast* is Roy Godson, professor of Government at Georgetown University who studies and teaches about international security affairs, and propaganda, active measures and disinformation as elements of statecraft.

Forecast will not attempt to refute Soviet themes or prescribe Western countermeasures. Some will maintain that by failing to do so we are giving further currency to Soviet disinformation and propaganda. Others may take the opposite view and infer that we are suggesting that anyone in the West who shares the Soviet interpretation

of events or who shares the Soviet view is being manipulated by Moscow.

We are mindful of these criticisms, but we do not believe that readers who are alerted to anticipated Soviet active measures will have difficulty recognizing them as such. On the contrary, being forewarned is to some extent being forearmed. Nor do we mean to imply that everyone or anyone who shares Soviet views on a given issue or reaches conclusions desired by Moscow, has been influenced or manipulated by them. We are postulating that Moscow continues to use active measures and we are attempting to project how these will be employed to achieve Soviet objectives in the near future.

FORMAT

Featured sections will include:

- *Anticipated Active Measures.* A description of themes, programs, and targets in the coming months.

- *Calendar of Significant Dates.* Times, places and dates of upcoming events likely to be exploited through active measures. Activities of communist parties, front organizations, and independent bodies where the Soviets can be expected to seek strong influence will be included. Key Western elections and government decisions likely to be targets will be highlighted.

- *Documented Active Measures.* Although Moscow goes to considerable length to hide major aspects of its active measures campaigns, on occasion Western governments, scholars and journalists are able to document substantial elements of these covert activities. This section will feature new documentation of past Soviet active measures that sheds light on current and future Soviet campaigns and tactics.

- *Vocabulary.* One or more key terms and concepts useful in understanding active measures will be defined.

Forecasting of any kind is extremely difficult. Undoubtedly we will not be able to anticipate all major active measures campaigns. Moscow also may change course in light of unexpected international developments, or the exposure of aspects of its covert activities. We will be refining our techniques constantly, and we welcome readers' comments and suggestions.

—*CALENDAR*—continued from page 1
US Peace Council's Fourth National Conference—(November 8-10) New Haven, Connecticut—the meeting of this Soviet front operation (identified as such by the FBI) may provide indications of Soviet priorities in the US during 1986.

Reagan-Gorbachev Summit—(November 19-20) Geneva, Switzerland.

1986

UN International Year of Peace—will be exploited worldwide by Moscow through the UN system, and more effectively through their array of international fronts and agents-of-influence in non-governmental organizations.

January

CPSU Secretariat to approve Annual Soviet Active Measures Plans—formal approvals for year-long themes and budgets.

Unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing expires.

SALT II Treaty expires—US never ratified the Treaty but has endorsed it. How Moscow plays this will depend to some extent on the Summit.

Global Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations—(January 20-24) Geneva, Switzerland—pro-Soviet organizations will predominate: theme "Together for Peace."

February

Twenty-Seventh CPSU Congress—Moscow codifies five-year foreign policy, defense, and economic plans. Gorbachev policy institutionalized. Major decision on CPSU Program (the Party's most fundamental document) which has been revised only three times previously in the Party's history.

March

Parliamentary elections in France—Socialist government vulnerable, especially to pro-Soviet Communist party activities.

May

Parliamentary elections in Holland—Christian Liberals in trouble; Labor Party is closer to Soviet defense priorities.

September

11th World Trade Union Congress. (World Federation of Trade Unions—Soviet international labor front)—Berlin, GDR (September 1—International Day of Trade Union Action for Peace.)

Summit of Non-Aligned Heads of State—Harare, Zimbabwe—Over 100 leaders expected to concentrate on anti-imperialism, as well as issues which divide the non-aligned.

October

World Peace Congress—(October 15-19) Copenhagen, Denmark—A World Peace Council function in cooperation with other Soviet fronts. Likely to attract broader based support as the major conference in celebration of the UN International Year of Peace.

THE KGB AND SOVIET DISINFORMATION: AN INSIDER'S VIEW

Ladislav Bittman
 New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985
 216pp, \$16.95

The author, a member of this publication's Advisory Committee, spent fourteen years in the service of Communist intelligence, including serving as deputy commander of the Czech intelligence and security service's disinformation department. He defected to the West in 1968, and his first book *The Deception Game* was published in 1972.

In this new volume, Bittman provides specific names, dates and places in describing Soviet and Czech operations designed to influence Western behavior. He discusses how Soviet



active measures have expanded dramatically over the last decade, and how the Soviet apparatus supporting these efforts is now "undoubtedly the largest and most effective system in the world." He describes in detail Soviet techniques designed to influence the Western peace movement and argues that Moscow used similar active measures during the Iranian hostage crisis to foment general confusion and anti-

Bittman The KGB and Soviet Disinformation



The KGB and SOVIET DISINFORMATION

An Insider's View

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Americanism. Also examined are Soviet schemes for obtaining Western science and technology. Bittman concludes that Soviet active measures have become more ambitious and their impact much broader in the last decade, and that the Soviets will continue to wield disinformation as a powerful political instrument to be used against the West.